Individual vs group incentive plans Research Paper

Individual vs group incentive plans - Research Paper Example The incentives can cause different levels of motivation to the employees; hence, creating a common objective in the long-run. From a human resource perspective, setting of individual goals will prevent the hiring of extra employees to perform the same task. The human resource department can also monitor the workers individually by introducing incentives and performance contracts. The individual plans will also reduce the cost incurred in dealing with human resources. Secondly, the employees have personal responsibilities over their outcomes. From an organizational view, the firm incurs benefits since it can specifically highlight the workers that do not meet the set standards. As a result, the workers will acquire the potential that is required to meet departmental goals and objectives. A human resource perspective shows that the presence of individual control will reduce the need for supervision in the firm. The workers will be solely responsible for their actions and will be aware of the repercussions. On the contrary, the individual incentives also incur disadvantages. For example, the plans do not lead to a healthy competition among the employees (Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel 195). The incentives may tend to favor some of the workers rather than others. Employees in the higher ranks may be issued with valuable motivation packages; hence discouraging those in the lower ranks. Moreover, the human resource department may also incur more costs to support all the workers through the incentive plans. Group incentives include the rewarding programs for collective performances. They are preferred due to various advantages to the human resource section and the organization at large (London and Oldham 37). Firstly, from an organizational perspective, the plans ensure that group objectives are met without any setbacks such as unskilled workers. The plans

Reflection paper Research Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words - 1

Reflection - Research Paper Example On the other side, the director did not try to make use of his individual freedom in the movie Lord of the Flies. In short, I consider the film Lord of the Flies as the visual version of the novel. This reflection paper is divided into three: human psychology, alienation and survival instinct, and struggle to gain ultimate power. Human psychology I like to visualize how I react when I happen to reach an uninhabited island. In the film, one can see that the director followed the novel, but provides ample importance to human psychology. For instance, the boys (say, military school cadets) like Ralph and Jack possess leadership quality. Ralph tries to make use of his leadership quality to help others and plans to escape from the island. But Jack makes of his leadership quality to intimidate others and to control them. The clash between Ralph and Jack divides the boys into two groups. One can see that cohesive feeling leads to unity in a diverse society. When we face a personal problem, our family members help us to solve the same. Within the context of the film, cohesive feeling helps the boys to survive. But some of the boys under Jack’s leadership exhibit their real character of savagery. On the other side, revolt against leadership is related to survival. ... In the film, Jack is not ready to use him leadership quality for the wellbeing of his followers. Instead, he tries to kill Ralph and his followers. So, the director makes use of the characters like Ralph and Jack to unveil the differences among human beings. Alienation and survival instinct If I happen to be in a far away Island, I will try my level best to survive. Then, I will consider the scope of escaping from the Island. One can see that survival is most important for an individual who is entrapped in a lonely island. In the film, the director portrays the boys’ attempt to survive in the island. The boys are military school cadets but they face alienation in the island because their motherland is far away. When we face the problem of alienation in the society, we react differently. For instance, some individuals will be ready to face the problem and some others will consider that their life is doomed. But some others will try to grab leadership. In the film, most of the b oys are ready to accept Ralphs’ leadership, because he is an inborn leader. The boys considered that Ralph can help the group to escape from the island. The survival instinct inherent in human beings is helpful to deal with critical conditions in life. But Jack considers Ralph as an enemy and tries to kill him. One can see that Jack’s aim was not to escape from the island, but to create his own kingdom in the island. He provides less importance to alienation and related issues. In the film, Ralph’s leadership proves to be unsuccessful because he fails to take apt decisions in critical conditions. On the other side, Jack exploits Ralph’s drawbacks and gains the confidence of the other members of the group. The struggle to gain ultimate power The fight between good and

Art After Philosophy (1969) Joseph Kosuth Essay Example for Free

Art After Philosophy (1969) Joseph Kosuth Essay The fact that it has recently become fashionable for physicists themselves to be sympathetic toward religion . . . marks the physicists’ own lack of confidence in the validity of their hypotheses, which is a reaction on their part from the antireligious dogmatism of nineteenth-century scientists, and a natural outcome of the crisis through which physics has just passed. –A. J. Ayer. . . . once one has understood the Tractatus there will be no temptation to concern oneself anymore with philosophy, which is neither empirical like science nor tautological like mathematics; one will, like Wittgenstein in 1918, abandon philosophy, which, as traditionally understood, is rooted in confusion. –J. O. Urmson. Traditional philosophy, almost by definition, has concerned itself with the unsaid. The nearly exclusive focus on the said by twentieth-century analytical linguistic philosophers is the shared contention that the unsaid is unsaid because it is unsayable. Hegelian philosophy made sense in the nineteenth century and must have been soothing to a century that was barely getting over Hume, the Enlightenment, and Kant.1 Hegel’s philosophy was also capable of giving cover for a defense of religious beliefs, supplying an alternative to Newtonian mechanics, and fitting in with the growth of history as a discipline, as well as accepting Darwinian biology.2 He appeared to give an acceptable resolution to the conflict between theology and science, as well. The result of Hegel’s influence has been that a great majority of contemporary philosophers are really little more than historians of philosophy, Librarians of the Truth, so to speak. One begins to get the impression that there â€Å"is nothing more to be said.† And certainly if one realizes the implications of Wittgenstein’s thinking, and the thinking influenced by him and after him, â€Å"Continental† philosophy need not seriously be considered here.3 Is there a reason for the â€Å"unreality† of philosophy in our time? Perhaps this can be answered by looking into the difference between our time and the centuries preceding us. In the past man’s conclusions about the world were based on the information he had about it – if not specifically like the empiricists, then generally like the rationalists. Often in fact, the closeness between science and philosophy was so great that scientists and philosophers were one and the same person. In fact, from the times of Thales, Epicurus, Heraclitus, and Aristotle to Descartes and Leibnitz, â€Å"the great names in philosophy were often great names in science as well.†4 That the world as perceived by twentieth-century science is a vastly different one than the one of its preceding century, need not be proved here. Is it possible, then, that in effect man has learned so much, and his â€Å"intelligence† is such, that he cannot believe the reasoning of traditional philosophy? That perhaps he knows too much about the world to make those kinds of conclusions? As Sir James Jeans has stated: . . . When philosophy has availed itself of the results of science, it has not been by borrowing the abstract mathematical description of the pattern of events, but by borrowing the then current pictorial description of this pattern; thus it has not appropriated certain knowledge but conjectures. These conjectures were often good enough for the man-sized world, but not, as we now know, for those ultimate processes of nature which control the happenings of the man-sized world, and bring us nearest to the true nature of reality.5 He continues: One consequence of this is that the standard philosophical discussions of many problems, such as those of causality and free will orof materialism or mentalism, are based on an interpretation of the pattern of events which is no longer tenable. The scientific basis of these older discussions has been washed away, and with their disappearance have gone all the arguments . . .6 The twentieth century brought in a time that could be called â€Å"the end of philosophy and the beginning of art.† I do not mean that, of course, strictly speaking, but rather as the â€Å"tendency† of the situation. Certainly linguistic philosophy can be considered the heir to empiricism, but it’s a philosophy in one gear.7 And there is certainly an â€Å"art condition† to art preceding Duchamp, but its other functions or reasons-to-be are so pronounced that its ability to function clearly as art limits its art condition so drastically that it’s only minimally art.8 In no mechanistic sense is there a connection between philosophy’s â€Å"ending† and art’s â€Å"beginning,† but I don’t find this occurrence entirely coincidental. Though the same reasons may be responsible for both occurrences, the connection is made by me. I bring this all up to analyze art’s function and subsequently its viability. And I do so to enable others to understand the reasoning of my – and, by extension, other artists’ – art, as well to provide a clearer understanding of the term â€Å"Conceptual art.†9 THE FUNCTION OF ART The main qualifications to the lesser position of painting is that advances in art are certainly not always formal ones. –Donald Judd (1963). Half or more of the best new work in the last few years has been neither painting nor sculpture. – Donald Judd (1965). Everything sculpture has, my work doesn’t. –Donald Judd (1967). The idea becomes a machine that makes the art. –Sol LeWitt (1965) The one thing to say about art is that it is one thing. Art is art-as-art and everything else is everything else. Art as art is nothing but art. Art is not what is not art. –Ad Reinhardt (1963). The meaning is the use. –Wittgenstein. A more functional approach to the study of concepts has tended to replace the method of introspection. Instead of attempting to grasp or describe concepts bare, so to speak, the psychologist investigates the way in which they function as ingredients in beliefs and in judgments. –Irving M. Copi. Meaning is always a presupposition of function. –T. Segerstedt. . . . the subject matter of conceptual investigations is the meaning of certain words and expressions – and not the things and states of affairs themselves about which we talk, when using those words and expressions. –G. H. Von Wright. Thinking is radically metaphoric. Linkage by analogy is its constituent law or principle, its causal nexus, since meaning only arises through the causal contexts by which a sign stands for (takes the place of) an instance of a sort. To think of anything is to take it as of a sort (as a such and such) and that â€Å"as† brings in (openly or in disguise) the analogy, the parallel, the metaphoric grapple or ground or grasp or draw by which alone the mind takes hold. It takes no hold if there is nothing for it to haul from, for its thinking is the haul, the attraction of likes –I. A. Richards. In this section I will discuss the separation between aesthetics and art; consider briefly formalist art (because it is a leading proponent of the idea of aesthetics as art), and assert that art is analogous to an analytic proposition, and that it is art’s existence as a tautology that enables art to remain â€Å"aloof† from philosophical presumptions. It is necessary to separate aesthetics from art because aesthetics deals with opinions on perception of the world in general. In the past one of the two prongs of art’s function was its value as decoration. So any branch of philosophy that dealt with â€Å"beauty† and thus, taste, was inevitably duty bound to discuss art as well. Out of this â€Å"habit† grew the notion that there was a conceptual connection between art and aesthetics, which is not true. This idea never drastically conflicted with artistic considerations before recent times, not only because the morphological characteristics of art perpetuated the continuity of this error, but as well, because the apparent other â€Å"functions† of art (depiction of religious themes, portraiture of aristocrats, detailing of architecture, etc.) used art to cover up art. When objects are presented within the context of art (and until recently objects always have been used) they are as eligible for aesthetic consideration as are any objects in the world, and an aesthetic consideration of an object existing in the realm of art means that the object’s existence or functioning in an art context is irrelevant to the aesthetic judgment. The relation of aesthetics to art is not unlike that of aesthetics to architecture, in that architecture has a very specific function and how â€Å"good† its design is is primarily related to how well it performs its function. Thus, judgments on what it looks like correspond to taste, and we can see that throughout history different examples of architecture are praised at different times depending on the aesthetics of particular epochs. Aesthetic thinking has even gone so far as to make examples of architecture not related to â€Å"art† at all, works of art in themselves (e.g., the pyramids of Egypt). Aesthetic considerations are indeed always extraneous to an object’s function or â€Å"reason-tobe.† Unless of course, that object’s reason-to-be is strictly aesthetic. An example of a purely aesthetic object is a decorative object, for decoration’s primary function is â€Å"to add something to, so as to make more attractive; adorn; ornament,†10 and this relates directly to taste. And this leads us directly to â€Å"formalist† art and criticism.11 Formalist art (painting and sculpture) is the vanguard of decoration, and, strictly speaking, one could reasonably assert that its art condition is so minimal that for all functional purposes it is not art at all, but pure exercises in aesthetics. Above all things Clement Greenberg is the critic of taste. Behind every one of his decisions is an aesthetic judgment, with those judgments reflecting his taste. And what does his taste reflect? The period he grew up in as a critic, the period â€Å"real† for him: the fifties.12 How else can one account for, given his theories – if they have any logic to them at all – his disinterest in Frank Stella, Ad Reinhardt, and others applicable to his historical scheme? Is it because he is â€Å". . . basically unsympathetic on personally experiential grounds†?13 Or, in other words, â€Å"their work doesn’t suit his taste?† But in the philosophic tabula rasa of art, â€Å"if someone calls it art,† as Don Judd has said, â€Å"it’s art.† Given this, formalist painting and sculpture can be granted an â€Å"art condition,† but only by virtue of their presentation in terms of their art idea (e.g., a rectangular-shaped canvas stretched over wooden supports and stained with such and such colors, using such and such forms, giving such and such a visual experience, etc.). If one looks at contemporary art in this light one realizes the minimal creative effort taken on the part of formalist artists specifically, an d all painters and sculptors (working as such today) generally. This brings us to the realization that formalist art and criticism accepts as a definition of art one that exists solely on morphological grounds. While a vast quantity of similar looking objects or images (or visually related objects or images) may seem to be related (or connected) because of a similarity of visual/experiential â€Å"readings,† one cannot claim from this an artistic or conceptual relationship. It is obvious then that formalist criticism’s reliance on morphology leads necessarily with a bias toward the morphology of traditional art. And in this sense their criticism is not related to a â€Å"scientific method† or any sort of empiricism (as Michael Fried, with his detailed descriptions of paintings and other â€Å"scholarly† paraphernalia would want us to believe). Formalist criticism is no more than an analysis of the physical attributes of particular objects that happen to exist in a morphological context. But this doesn’t add any knowledge (or facts) to our understanding of the nature or function of art. And neither does it comment on whether or not the objects analyzed are even works of art, in that formalist critics always bypass the conceptual element in works of art. Exactly why they don’t comment on the conceptual element in works of art is precisely because formalist art is only art by virtue of its resemblance to earlier works of art. It’s a mindless art. Or, as Lucy Lippard so succinctly described Jules Olitski’s paintings: â€Å"they’re visual Muzak.† 14 Formalist critics and artists alike do not question the nature of art, but as I have said elsewhere: Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is questioning the nature of painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art. If an artist accepts painting (or sculpture) he is accepting the tradition that goes with it. That’s because the word art is general and the word painting is specific. Painting is a kind of art. If you make paintings you are already accepting (not questioning) the nature of art. One is then accepting the nature of art to be the European tradition of a painting-sculpture dichotomy.15 The strongest objection one can raise against a morphological justification for traditional art is that morphological notions of art embody an implied a priori concept of art’s possibilities. And such an a priori concept of the nature of art (as separate from analytically framed art propositions or â€Å"work,† which I will discuss later) makes it, indeed, a priori: impossible to question the nature of art. And this questioning of the nature of art is a very important concept in understanding the function of art. The function of art, as a question, was first raised by Marcel Duchamp. In fact it is Marcel Duchamp whom we can credit with giving art its own identity. (One can certainly see a tendency toward this self-identification of art beginning with Manet and Cà ©zanne through to Cubism,16 but their works are timid and ambiguous by comparison with Duchamp’s.) â€Å"Modern† art and the work before seemed connected by virtue of their morphology. Another way of putting it would be that art’s â€Å"language† remained the same, but it was saying new things. The event that made conceivable the realization that it was possible to â€Å"speak another language† and still make sense in art was Marcel Duchamp’s first unassisted Ready-made. With the unassisted Ready-made, art changed its focus from the form of the language to what was being said. Which means that it changed the nature of art from a question of morphology to a question of function. This change – one from â€Å"appearance† to â€Å"conception† – was the beginning of â€Å"modern† art and the beginning of conceptual art. All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually. The â€Å"value† of particular artists after Duchamp can be weighed according to how much they questioned the nature of art; which is another way of saying â€Å"what they added to the conception of art† or what wasn’t there before they started. Artists question the nature of art by presenting new propositions as to art’s nature. And to do this one cannot concern oneself with the handed-down â€Å"language† of traditional art, as this activity is based on the assumption that there is only one way of framing art propositions. But the very stuff of art is indeed greatly related to â€Å"creating† new propositions. The case is often made – particularly in reference to Duchamp – that objects of art (such as the Ready-mades, of course, but all art is implied in this) are judged as objets d’art in later years and the artists’ intentions become irrelevant. Such an argument is the case of a preconceived notion ordering together not necessarily related facts. The point is this: aesthetics, as we have pointed out, are conceptually irrelevant to art. Thus, any physical thing can become objet d’art, that is to say, can be considered tasteful, aesthetically pleasing, etc. But this has no bearing on the object’s application to an art context; that is, its functioning in an art context. (E.g., if a collector takes a painting, attaches legs, and uses it as a dining table it’s an act unrelated to art or the artist because, as art, that wasn’t the artist’s intention.) And what holds true for Duchamp’s work applies as well to most of the art after him. In other words, the value of Cubism – for instance – is its idea in the realm of art, not the physical or visual qualities seen in a specific painting, or the particularization of certain colors or shapes. For these colors and shapes are the art’s â€Å"language,† not its meaning conceptually as art. To look upon a Cubist â€Å"masterwork† now as art is nonsensical, conceptually speaking, as far as art is concerned. (That visual information that was unique in Cubism’s language has now been generally absorbed and has a lot to do with the way in which one deals with painting â€Å"linguistically.† [E.g., what a Cubist painting meant experimentally and conceptually to, say, Gertrude Stein, is beyond our speculation because the same painting then â€Å"meant† something different than it does now.]) The â€Å"value† now of an original Cubist painting is not unlike, in most respects, an original manuscript by Lord Byron, or The Spirit of St. Louis as it is seen in the Smithsonian Institution. (Indeed, museums fill the very same function as the Smithsonian Institution – why else would the Jeu de Paume wing of the Louvre exhibit Cà ©zanne’s and Van Gogh’s palettes as proudly as they do their paintings?) Actual works of art are little more than historical curiosities. As far as art is concerned Van Gogh’s paintings aren’t worth any more than his palette is. They are both â€Å"collectors items.†17 Art â€Å"lives† through influencing other art, not by existing as the physical residue of an artist’s ideas. The reason that different artists from the past are â€Å"brought alive† again is because some aspect of their work becomes â€Å"usable† by living artists. That there is no â€Å"truth† as to what art is seems quite unrealized. What is the function of art, or the nature of art? If we continue our analogy of the forms art takes as being art’s language one can realize then that a work of art is a kind of proposition presented within the context of art as a comment on art. We can then go further and analyze the types of â€Å"propo sitions.† A. J. Ayer’s evaluation of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic is useful to us here: â€Å"A proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience.†18 The analogy I will attempt to make is one between the art condition and the condition of the analytic proposition. In that they don’t appear to be believable as anything else, or be about anything (other than art) the forms of art most clearly finally referable only to art have been forms closest to analytical propositions. Works of art are analytic propositions. That is, if viewed within their context – as art – they provide no information whatsoever about any matter of fact. A work of art is a tautology in that it is a presentation of the artist’s intention, that is, he is saying that that particular work of art is art, which means, is a definition of art. Thus, that it is art is true a priori (which is what Judd means when he states that â€Å"if someone calls it art, it’s art†). Indeed, it is nearly impossible to discuss art in general terms without talking in tautologies – for to attempt to â€Å"grasp† art by any other â€Å"handle† is merely to focus on another aspect or quality of the proposition, which is usually irrelevant to the artwork’s â€Å"art condition.† One begins to realize that art’s â€Å"art condition† is a conceptual state. That the language forms that the artist frames his propositions in are often â€Å"private† codes or languages is an inevitable outcome of art’s freedom from morphological constrictions; and it follows from this that one has to be familiar with contemporary art to appreciate it and understand it. Likewise one understands why the â€Å"man in the street† is intolerant to artistic art and always demands art in a tr aditional â€Å"language.† (And one understands why formalist art sells â€Å"like hot cakes.†) Only in painting and sculpture did the artists all speak the same language. What is called â€Å"Novelty Art† by the formalists is often the attempt to find new languages, although a new language doesn’t necessarily mean the framing of new propositions: e.g., most kinetic and electronic art. Another way of stating, in relation to art, what Ayer asserted about the analytic method in the context of language would be the following: The validity of artistic propositions is not dependent on any empirical, much less any aesthetic, presupposition about the nature of things. For the artist, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way (1) in which art is capable of conceptual growth and (2) how his propositions are capable of logically following that growth.19 In other words, the propositions of art are not factual, but linguistic in character – that is, they do not describe the behavior of physical, o r even mental objects; they express definitions of art, or the formal consequences of definitions of art. Accordingly, we can say that art operates on a logic. For we shall see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical inquiry is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions (of art) and not with questions of empirical fact.20 To repeat, what art has in common with logic and mathematics is that it is a tautology; i.e., the â€Å"art idea† (or â€Å"work†) and art are the same and can be appreciated as art without going outside the context of art for verification. On the other hand, let us consider why art cannot be (or has difficulty when it attempts to be) a synthetic proposition. Or, that is to say, when the truth or falsity of its assertion is verifiable on empirical grounds. Ayer states: . . . The criterion by which we determine the validity of an a priori or analytical proposition is not sufficient to determine the validity of an empirical or synthetic proposition. For it is characteristic of empirical propositions that their validity is not purely formal. To say that a geometrical proposition, or a system of geometrical propositions, is false, is to say that it is self-contradictory. But an empirical proposition, or a system of empirical propositions, may be free from contradiction and still be false. It is said to be false, not because it is formally defective, but because it fails to satisfy some material criterion.21 The unreality of â€Å"realistic† art is due to its framing as an art proposition in synthetic terms: one is always tempted to â€Å"verify† the proposition empirically. Realism’s synthetic state does not bring one to a circular swing back into a dialogue with the larger framework of questions about the nature of art (as does the work of Malevich, Mondrian, Pollock, Reinhardt, early Rauschenberg, Johns, Lichtenstein, Warhol, Andre, Judd, Flavin, LeWitt, Morris, and others), but rather, one is flung out of art’s â€Å"orbit† into the â€Å"infinite space† of the human condition. Pure Expressionism, continuing with Ayer’s terms, could be considered as such: â€Å"A sentence which consisted of demonstrative symbols would not express a genuine proposition. It would be a mere ejaculation, in no way characterizing that to which it was supposed to refer.† Expressionist works are usually such â€Å"ejaculations† presented in the morphological language of traditional art. If Pollock is important it is because he painted on loose canvas horizontally to the floor. What isn’t important is that he later put those drippings over stretchers and hung them parallel to the wall. (In other words what is important in art is what one brings to it, not one’s adoption of what was previously existing.) What is even less important to art is Pollock’s notions of â€Å"self-expression† because those kinds of subjective meanings are useless to anyone other than those involved with him personally. And their â€Å"specific† quality puts them outside of art’s context. â€Å"I do not make art,† Richard Serra says, â€Å"I am engaged in an activity; if someone wants to call it art, that’s his business, but it’s not up to me to decide that. That’s all figured out later.† Serra, then, is very much aware of the implications of his work. If Serra is indeed just â€Å"figuring out what lead does† (gravitationally, molecularly, etc.), why should anyone think of it as art? If he doesn’t take the responsibility of it being art, who can, or should? His work certainly appears to be empirically verifiable: lead can do, and be used for, many physical activities. In itself this does anything but lead us into a dialogue about the nature of art. In a sense then he is a primitive. He has no idea about art. How is it then that we know about â€Å"his activity†? Because he has told us it is art by his actions after â€Å"his activity† has taken place. That is, by the fact that he is with several galleries, puts the physical residue of his activity in museums (and sells them to art collectors – but as we have pointed out, collectors are irrelevant to the â€Å"condition of art† of a work). That he denies his work is art but plays the artist is more than just a paradox. Serra secretly feels that â€Å"arthood† is arrived at empirically. Thus, as Ayer has stated: There are no absolutely certain empirical propositions. It is only tautologies that are certain. Empirical questions are one and all hypotheses, which may be confirmed or discredited in actual sense experience. And the propositions in which we record the observations that verify these hypotheses are themselves hypotheses which are subject to the test of further sense experience. Thus there is no final proposition.22 What one finds all throughout the writings of Ad Reinhardt is this very similar thesis of â€Å"artas-art,† and that â€Å"art is always dead, and a ‘living’ art is a deception.†23 Reinhardt had a very clear idea about the nature of art, and his importance is far from recognized. Because forms of art that can be considered synthetic propositions are verifiable by the world, that is to say, to understand these propositions one must leave the tautological-like framework of art and consider â€Å"outside† information. But to consider it as art it is necessary to ignore this same outside information, because outside information (experiential qualities, to note) has its own intrinsic worth. And to comprehend this worth one does not need a state of â€Å"art condition.† From this it is easy to realize that art’s viability is not connected to the presentation of visual (or other) kinds of experience. That that may have been one of art’s extraneous functions in the preceding centuries is not unlikely. After all, man in even the nineteenth century lived in a fairly standardized visual environment. That is, it was ordinarily predictable as to what he would be coming into contact with day after day. His visual environment in the part of the world in which he lived was fairly consistent. In our time we have an experientially drastically richer environment. One can fly all over the earth in a matter of hours and days, not months. We have the cinema, and color television, as well as the man-made spectacle of the lights of Las Vegas or the skyscrapers of New York City. The whole world is there to be seen, and the whole world can watch man walk on the moon from their living rooms. Certainly art or objects of painting and sculpture cannot be expected to compete experientially with this? The notion of â€Å"use† is relevant to art and its â€Å"language.† Recently the box or cube form has been used a great deal within the context of art. (Take for instance its use by Judd, Morris, LeWitt, Bladen, Smith, Bell, and McCracken – not even mentioning the quantity of boxes and cubes that came after.) The difference between all the various uses of the box or cube form is directly related to the differences in the intentions of the artists. Further, as is particularly seen in Judd’s work, the use of the box or cube form illustrates very well our earlier claim that an object is only art when placed in the context of art. A few examples will point this out. One could say that if one of Judd’s box forms was seen filled with debris, seen placed in an industrial setting, or even merely seen sitting on a street corner, it would not be identified with art. It follows then that understanding and consideration of it as an artwork is necessary a priori to viewing it in order to â€Å"see† it as a work of art. Advance information about the concept of art and about an artist’s concepts is necessary to the appreciation and understanding of contemporary art. Any and all of the physical attributes (qualities) of contemporary works, if considered separately and/or specifically, are irrelevant to the art concept. The art concept (as Judd said, though he didn’t mean it this way) must be considered in its whole. To consider a concept’s parts is invariably to consider aspects that are irrelevant to its art condition – or like reading parts of a definition. It comes as no surprise that the art with the least fixed morphology is the example from which we decipher the nature of the general term â€Å"art.† For where there is a context existing separately of its morphology and consisting of its function one is more likely to find results less conforming and predictable. It is in modern art’s possession of a â€Å"language† with the shortest history that the plausibility of the abandonment of that â€Å"language† becomes most possible. It is understandable then that the art that came out of Western painting and sculpture is the most energetic, questioning (of its nature), and the least assuming of all the general â€Å"art† concerns. In the final analysis, however, all of the arts have but (in Wittgenstein’s terms) a â€Å"family† resemblance. Yet the various qualities relatable to an â€Å"art condition† possessed by poetry, the novel, the cinema, the theatre, and various forms of mus ic, etc., is that aspect of them most reliable to the function of art as asserted here. Is not the decline of poetry relatable to the implied metaphysics from poetry’s use of â€Å"common† language as an art language?24 In New York the last decadent stages of poetry can be seen in the move by â€Å"Concrete† poets recently toward the use of actual objects and theatre.25 Can it be that they feel the unreality of their art form? We see now that the axioms of a geometry are simply definitions, and that the theorems of a geometry are simply the logical consequences of these definitions. A geometry is not in itself about physical space; in itself it cannot be said to be â€Å"about† anything. But we can use a geometry to reason about physical space. That is to say, once we have given the axioms a physical interpretation, we can proceed to apply the theorems to the objects which satisfy the axioms. Whether a geometry can be applied to the actual physical world or not, is an empirical question which falls outside the scope of geometry itself. There is no sense, therefore, in asking which of the various geometries known to us are false and which are true. Insofar as they are all free from contradiction, they are all true. The proposition which states that a certain application of a geometry is possible is not itself a proposition of that geometry. All that the geometry itself tells us is that if anything can be brought under the definitions, it will also satisfy the theorems. It is therefore a purely logical system, and its propositions are purely analytic propositions. –A. J. Ayer26 Here then I propose rests the viability of art. In an age when traditional philosophy is unreal because of its assumptions, art’s ability to exist will depend not only on its not performing a service – as entertainment, visual (or other) experience, or decoration – which is something easily replaced by kitsch culture, and technology, but, rather, it will remain viable by not assuming a philosophical stance; for in art’s unique character is the capacity to remain aloof from philosophical judgments. It is in this context that art shares similarities with logic, mathematics, and, as well, science. But whereas the other endeavors are useful, art is not. Art indeed exists for its own sake. In this period of man, after philosophy and religion, art may possibly be one endeavor that fulfills what another age might have called â€Å"man’s spiritual needs.† Or, another way of putting it might be that art deals analogously with the state of things â€Å"beyond physics† where philosophy had to make assertions. And art’s strength is that even the preceding sentence is an assertion, and cannot be verified by art. Art’s only claim is for art. Art is the definition of art. NOTES * Reprinted from Studio International (October, 1969). 1 Morton White, The Age of Analysis (New York: Mentor Books), p. 14. 2 Ibid., p. 15. 3 I mean by this Existentialism and Phenomenology. Even Merleau-Ponty, with his middle-of-the-road position between empiricism and rationalism, cannot express his philosophy without the use of words (thus using concepts); and following this, how can one discuss experience without sharp distinctions between ourselves and the world? 4 Sir James Jeans, Physics and Philosophy (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press), p. 17. 5 Ibid., p. 190. 6 Ibid., p. 190. 7 The task such philosophy has taken upon itself is the only â€Å"function† it could perform without making philosophic assertions. 8 This is dealt with in the following section. 9 I would like to make it clear, however, that I intend to speak for no one else. I arrived at these conclusions alone, and indeed, it is from this thinking that my art since 1966 (if not before) evo lved. Only recently did I realize after meeting Terry Atkinson that he and Michael Baldwin share similar, though certainly not identical, opinions to mine. 10 Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language. 11 The conceptual level of the work of Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Morris Louis, Ron Davis, Anthony Caro, John Hoyland, Dan Christensen, et al., is so dismally low, that any that is there is supplied by the critics promoting it. This is seen later. 12 Michael Fried’s reasons for using Greenberg’s rationale reflect his background (and most of the other formalist critics) as a â€Å"scholar,† but more of it is due to his desire, I suspect, to bring his scholarly studies into the modern world. One can easily sympathize with his desire to connect, say, Tiepolo with Jules Olitski. One should never forget, however, that a historian loves history more than anything, even art. 13 Lucy Lippard uses this quotation in a footnote to Ad Reinhardt’s retrospective catalogue, January, 1967, p. 28. 14 Lucy Lippard, â€Å"Constellation by Harsh Daylight: The Whitney Annual,† Hudson Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring, 1968). 15 Arthur R. Rose, â€Å"Four Interviews,† Arts Magazine (February, 1969). 16 As Terry Atkinson pointed out in his introduction to Art-Language (Vol. 1, No. 1), the Cubists never questioned if art had morphological characteristics, but which ones in painting were acceptable. 17 When someone â€Å"buys† a Flavin he isn’t buying a light show, for if he was he could just go to a hardware store and get the goods for considerably less. He isn’t â€Å"buying† anything. He is subsidizing Flavin’s activity as an artist. 18 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications), p. 78. 19 Ibid., p. 57. 20 Ibid., p. 57. 21 Ibid., p.90. 22 Ibid., p. 94. 23 Ad Reinhardt’s retrospective catalogue (Jewish Museum, January, 1967) written by Lucy Lippard, p. 12. 24 It is poetry’s use of common language to attempt to say the unsayable that is problematic, not any inherent problem in the use of language within the context of art. 25 Ironically, many of them call themselves â€Å"Conceptual Poets.† Much of this work is very similar to Walter de Maria’s work and this is not coincidental; de Maria’s work functions as a kind of â€Å"object† poetry, and his intentions are very poetic: he really wants his work to change men’s lives. 26 Op. cit., p. 82.

Other Personality Traits That Affect Managerial Behaviour Sociology Essay

Other Personality Traits That Affect Managerial Behaviour Sociology Essay Leadership is the action of leading a group of people or an organization, or the ability to do this Oxford Dictionary. A person exerts influence over other people, which inspires, motivates and directs their activities to help achieve common performance goals (Yukl, 1989 as cited in George Jones, 2006). The person who exerts such influence is a leader. With the influence they exert, effective leaders help groups and organisations to achieve a goal. Effective leadership also increases an organisations ability to meet all the contemporary challenges such as obtain a competitive advantage, the need to promote acceptable ethical behaviour and is essential to manage a diverse workforce fairly and impartially. As a result, this will raise the organisations chances of success (George Jones, 2006). Nowadays due to the exceptionally challenging era, leadership can be very demanding because of the pace of change, the illusion of control and the high expectations of followers (Arnold Rendall, 2010).A leader can adopt his own personal qualities, behaviours styles and decisions to develop his own leadership style (Arnold Rendall, 2010). Early leader-focused approaches to leadership have 2 main features: a description of the leader in terms of their characteristics and/or behaviour and the investigation and analysis and of the characteristics and or behaviours of what makes a good leaders regardless of what they lead (Arnold Rendall, 2010). Early leadership was more focused on finding the best characteristics that makes a person a leader or effective leader. Early work such as the work of House and Baetz (1979) came up with what characteristics that leaders tend to have at a higher degree than non-leaders. These characteristics include intelligence, dominance/need for power, self-confidence and knowledge of the task. (House Baetz , 1979). Bass (1990) also included other personality traits such as good adjustment, emotional balance and high integrity which were found to be common traits amongst leaders. (Bass, 1990) This early research did yield some interesting results but researchers did not find a constant profile of characteristics which are common to all leaders however personality and intelligence seem to be fundamental for persons to emerge as leaders and ultimately be effective leaders (Arnold Rendall, 2010). The Big Five Personality Traits People have certain characteristics which are constant to them throughout their life which can influence how they think, feel and behave both on and off the job (George Jones, 2006). These characteristic are called personality traits. These traits make you act, feel and think in certain ways which makes every individual unique. It is very important that these traits are understood since every persons personality influences their behaviour and their approach to managing people and resources (George Jones, 2006). An individuals personality is composed of five general traits or characteristics, these being extraversion, negative affectivity, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness to experience (Digman, 1990). Each personality trait is viewed as a continuum along which every individual falls. A person can fall on the high end part or on the low end part or else somewhere in between. A persons approach to management can be described in how people are like at the high and low ends of each continuum which is an easy way to understand how these trait affect a persons approach (George Jones, 2006). The effectiveness of each trait is determined by a complex interaction between the nature of the job or organisation in which they are working and the characteristics of the person. Furthermore, some personality traits might be effective in one situation but can decrease the effectiveness in another situation. (George Jones, 2006) There are other personality traits in addition to the big five that describe peoples personalities. These are specifically important for understanding managerial effectiveness. Some examples are self-esteem, locus of control and need for achievement. Research by Fred E. Fiedler acknowledged that effective leadership depends on the characteristics of the leader and of the situation. Fiedler came up with the Contingency theory of leadership. He explains why a manager or leader may be capable in one situation and incapable in another. It also suggests which kinds of managers or leaders are more effective in different situations (George Jones, 2006). He argued that leaders have rather stable personal characteristic, leading to a characteristic behavioural style. In his theory, Fiedler assumed that how much a leader is person-oriented depends on the leaders perception of their least preferred co-worker. He concluded that task-oriented leaders are best in very favourable and unfavourable situations and those person-oriented leaders are best in moderately favourable or moderately unfavourable situations (Arnold Rendall, 2010). Desired and acceptable leadership characteristics may vary across organisational context. Sociability, need for power and need for achievement are considerably relevant characteristics which are consistent across different organisations and organisational cultures. (House Baetz , 1979). House and Baetz (1979) came up with two insights which are generally accepted by persons studying leadership: if certain characteristics are to have an impact on others and their performance, these personal characteristics need to be observable in the leader and that leader characteristics and behaviours depend on the different type of task (House Baetz , 1979). Recent studies have pointed out the effects of personal and situational factors on the development of an individual as a leader. Amongst these personal factors are personality traits and gender (Jacobowitz Pratch, 1996).One of the most distinct and difficult to change characteristics is gender. Leadership roles are typically described in stereotypically masculine terms. This could mean that women have a slight disadvantage over men in being selected for leadership roles and when selected it is difficult for them to be seen as good leaders. Leadership roles are typically predominated by men but in recent years women in leadership positions have increased considerably (Corrigall, Konrad, Lieb, Ritchie JR, 2000). This has prompted a lot of researchers to explore the relationship between gender and leadership. While the number of women in management positions has increased, there are still very few women who hold high level executive positions (Corrigall, Konrad, Lieb, Ritchie JR, 2000). It is believed that women tend to prefer jobs who offer a reward rather than high pay and advancement, which might be the explanation of their failure to attain more jobs at the top level positions (George Jones, 2006). The styles of male and female leaders may influenced by the gender-based expectations. Individuals establish certain expectations for their own and others behaviour which is based on their own beliefs about what the appropriate behaviour of male and females should be like. (Eagly, 1987) Women are stereotypically described as nurturing, supportive and concerned with interpersonal relations whilst men are viewed as being directive and focused on task accomplishment (George Jones, 2006) These stereotypes suggest that women can be more relationship oriented as managers and are more considerable in their behaviour. Men are seen as more directed towards task-orientation and engage in more initiating-structure behaviours (George Jones, 2006). People have become accustomed to the styles that men have since men have long held these roles. As a result, there is more focus on women in the discussion of the impact of gender on leadership (Eagly Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). There is little agreement about how women actually lead even though there is this greater focus on women in research. Feminists writings have given great importance to differences and similarities between leadership styles in males and females. (Eagly Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). A number of researchers state that there is a difference between women and men having a leadership position, whilst others say that there is no difference. Eagly and Johnson (1990) state that male and female managers having a leadership position, tend to behave in similar ways. Men do not engage in more initiating structure than women and women do not engage in more consideration than men (Eagly Johnson, 1990). Writers of trade books, have argued that thre is a difference in leadership behaviour between males and females. They tend to see women as being less hierarchical, more cooperative and ollaborative and more oriented to enhancing others self worth (Book, 2000). On the contrary, social scientists say that there is no or minimal difference iin female and male organizational leaders. (Eagly Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). Job Attribute Preference Research has show that job attribute preference may direct a male or female manager to a different set of jobs, career paths and emplyers due to the existence of sex difference (Beutell Brenner, 1986). Job attributes have been divided into two categories: intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Job aspects that fulfil material or social needs are termed intrinsic factors and job aspects that fullfil higher needs such as growth, esteem and self expression are termed intrinsic factors. (Pinder, 1998) Research on sex differences and similarities in job attribute preferences has been enriched by two distinct theoretical persecpetives: the gender ideology perspective and the structuralist persepective. Different personality characteristics and different sets of ativities for women and man are dictated by gendered societal norms in existence is the view of the gender ideology perspective. The structuralist perspectives argues that women have poorer quality jobs than men on average because of the segregation and discrimination in the labor market. (Corrigall, Konrad, Lieb, Ritchie JR, 2000). Both of the perspectives conclude that job attribute preferences for men and women are different by they assign casualty to different underlying mecchanisms. They both predict that there will be a change in the pattern of sex differnces in job attribute preferences over time, however they conclude that the patterns of change will be somewhat different. Gender Ideology Gender ideology may be described as socially-constructed script that prescribes different characteristics, values, attitudes, behaviors and activities for women and men (West Zimmerman , 1991)Gender ideology is composed of gender roles and gender stereotypes. Gender roles are sets of norms presribing the behaiors and activities appropriate for each sex (Best Williams, 1990). Gender roles differ by cultures but in Western industrialised societies attribute the role of income provider for the family to the men and the role of homemaker to the women. Gender stereotypes are different personality characateristics which are expected from men and women. Characterisitcs such as nurturing, affiliation and passivity were associated with the females whilst characteristics such as autonomy, aggression, dominance and achievement were ascribed more to males (Best Williams, 1990).People tend to conform to gender expectations to avoid the disapproval from others. If peoples choice ofwork would reflect gender ideology, then men should consider responsibility, autonomy earnings, advancement, prestige, recognition and challenge to be more important than women do. Whilst women should value more job security, good coworkers, a good supervisor, physical work environment, helping others, growth/development opportunities, opportunities to use ones abillities, variety, task significance a feeling of accomplishment and good hours to be more important than men do. In this study conducted by Corrigall, Konrad, Lieb and Ritchie, it was found that men attached more importance to earnings and responsibility than women did. This reflects the idea that men take on the role of provider and that they need to demonstrate success and status reflecting the ideas of gender roles and stereotypes towards men. On the other hand women attached greater importance to all mentioned attributes which show that women take the role of homemaker and to demonstarte nuturing and expressiveness. The findings relate to the gender roles typically attributed to women. (Corrigall, Konrad, Lieb, Ritchie JR, 2000) Leadership styles of males and females The styles of males and females can be described in terms of the stereotypes of masculinity and femminity. Studies of peoples stereotypes about men and women show that the popular beliefs about male and female behaviour can be compiled, following Bakan (1966), in terms of two dimensions, the agentic and the communal attributes. (Jacobowitz Pratch, 1996) Agentic characteristics define primarily an assertive, controlling and confident tendency. These characteristics are typically ascribed to more strongly to men than to women. Agentic behaviours, in employment settings might include speaking assertively, competing for attention, influencing others, initiating activity directed to assigned taks and making problem-focused suggestions (Eagly Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). Women are more ascribed to communal characteristics. This is because communal characteristics describe primarily a concern with the welfare of other people. Examples of communal characteristics in employment settings are speaking tentatively, not drawing attention to oneself, accepting others direction, supporting others and contributing to the solution of relational and interpersonal problems (Eagly Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). Leader roles and gender roles Female leaders can adopt leadership styles that differe from those of men because they need to accommodate their behaviour to the occasioanlly conflicting demands of the female gender role and their role as a leader. There are different implications for the behaviour of male and female leaders due to gender roles. This is not only because male and female roles have different content but there is a discrepancy perceivers associate with women as having communal qualties and successful leaders are perceived as having agentic qualities. Since agentic properties are more associated to men, people tend to believe that men are better at being leaders than females. (Eagly Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001) Eagly and Karau(2001) argued that apparent difference between the typical leader roles and the female gender tends to ccreate prejudice towards female leaders. It takes two forms: (a)less favorable evaluation of womens (than mens) potential leadership because leadership ability is more stereotypic of men than women and (b)less favorable evaluation of the actual leadership behavior of women than men because agentic behaviour is perceived as less desirable in women than men. In the first prejudice, womens characteristics and the resulting female-stereotypic qualities are different from what is expected and desired in leaders. This is a result from the descriptive norms of gender roles. The second prejudice arises from prescriptive norms of gender roles namely the beliefs of how women ough to behave. Women leaders can be negatively assessed for fullfilling the agentic requirements of leader roles and thus failing to comply with the communal characteristics, even though they may be praised for their fulfillment of the leader role. (Eagly Karau, 2001) On the other hand, Sherpe (2000) states that after years of analyzing what makes leaders more effective, management gurus now know how to maximise the chances of getting a great executive. Their answer is to hire a women. The idea was first introduce by the writers feminist trade books on management and is now making tis way into the popular culture. (Carli Eagly, 2003) However in Malta, women have the highest rate of female inactivity 65.2% compared to other E.U. countries 35.7%. (Spiteri, 2012). Nevertheless, there was an increase in the rate of employement for woman which now stands at 62%,which has gone up from 55% in 1997 (Almunia, Andor, Barnier , Reding, Rehn, Tajani, 2012). Many women continue to face a glass ceiling, holding them backe in achieving a higher level in their work place. Men dominate company boards: 86.3% of board members and 96.8% of the boardroom chairs, whilst women make up 13.7% and 3.2% respectively. (Almunia, Andor, Barnier , Reding, Rehn, Tajani, 2012). Women in Malta represent only 3% of board members which is well below the EU average of 13.7% (Spiteri, 2012). On the other hand, there is a higher pecentage (22.7%) of Maltese women who are achieving higher levels of tertiary education than men(14.6%), even though when compared to other E.U. countries it is still very low (37.2% women and 30% men) (Spiteri, 2012). The National Statistics Office in collaboration with the National Council of women in Malta carried out a survey on the Perceived Obstacles to the participation of women in Decision-making Positions (2007). The rsult of this survey states that many women in malta are not advancing in their work to obtain top post because of 3 main difficulties: difficulties in reconciling long hours of work and family responsabilities, very little use of childcare facilities and lack of spouse/partner suport (National Statistics Office, 2007). Maltese Governments have always put measures in place to promote gender equality through various legislations and regulations. The constitution of Malta guarantees equaltiy between women and men. It gives protection against discrimination on various grounds including sex. Additionally, there is Article 45(11) swhich provides for special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between males and females (Spiteri, 2012). In 1991 Malta also approved the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Even though these measures have been in place for a few years now, there is still a general idea that men are seen as being more siutable at having a decision-making job. There are also a number of structural and cultural barriers which are preventing Maltese women from achieving further in their job. Such barriers include jobs without opportunities of promotion or training, practices that favour men for promotions, lack of employment laws and lack of sharing of household/childcare responsibilities by fathers. There is also a considerably big barrier being the attitudes and perceptions towards gendered roles in Malta. (Spiteri, 2012). In this study, I am going to focus on the perceptions that University students have towards leaders. Whether they tend to prefer male or female leaders and on what is their decision based on. Also, I am going to study what University Students think about the effectiveness of males and females in different work settings and what is the reasoning behind the idea.

Leslie Marmon Silkos Ceremony Essay -- essays papers

Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony In Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony, the gender roles of three women are significant to the development of Tayo as being half-white and half-Indian. These three women are Tayo's birth mother, Auntie, and Old Grandma. His mother left him when he was four years old and that began his sense of emptiness and abandonment. She could not bear to raise a child that brought the reservation shame by her mistake. Auntie raised Tayo and was the mother figure he lacked. She willingly accepted to take him, but only to "conceal the shame of her younger sister (29)". Auntie was always hesitant toward Tayo as he was not her real son and was also a half-breed. For Tayo, this only added to his feeling of displacement and emptiness. She would give her affection and ... Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony Essay -- essays papers Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony In Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony, the gender roles of three women are significant to the development of Tayo as being half-white and half-Indian. These three women are Tayo's birth mother, Auntie, and Old Grandma. His mother left him when he was four years old and that began his sense of emptiness and abandonment. She could not bear to raise a child that brought the reservation shame by her mistake. Auntie raised Tayo and was the mother figure he lacked. She willingly accepted to take him, but only to "conceal the shame of her younger sister (29)". Auntie was always hesitant toward Tayo as he was not her real son and was also a half-breed. For Tayo, this only added to his feeling of displacement and emptiness. She would give her affection and ...

Capital Punishment Essay -- essays research papers

On July 2, 1976, almost two hundred years since the United States of America passed the Declaration of Independence, the Supreme Court legalized capital punishment (Appendix 1). Capital punishment executed for the crime of theft. Since then there have been an estimated 18,000 to 20,000 people lawfully executed(Espy pp.194). In the eighteenth century, England would punish by death for crimes such as pick pocketing and petty theft. After the 1650's colonist could be put to death for denying the true god or cursing their parents advocates. Capital punishment has clashed for a long time in the forum of public opinion in state legislatures and most recently in courts. In 1972, the case of Furman vs. Georgia (Appendix 1) reached the supreme court. The court decided that punishment by death did indeed violate the Eighth Amendment and the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment." Because of this decision death sentences all over the country were set aside. Since then capital punishment has become an increasingly controversial issue. In arguments against the death penalty in the United States, several themes have remained constant. Abolitionists have always claimed that capital punishment is not an effective deterrent, or at least, nobetter than long term imprisonment. Furthermore they argue that it imposed unreasonable risks in the possibility of executing the wrong person; that a willingness to use it tends to brutalize society; that it has never been administered in a morally unobjectable manner; and finally that it is used mainly against relatively defenseless members of minority groups. During the past generation, opposition to the death penalty has been put into the context of a struggle to wipe out racism. Among the foremost writers who have criticized the death penalty is Charles L. Black, Jr., Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School. In his book, Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake, he deals with many of the problems surrounding capital punishment. In regards to race he asks the question, "Why are more than half the people on death row black in a country with about eleven percent blacks (78) ? According to a study brought by Black, in cases of a black killing a white, .214 are sentenced to death, while in a case of a white killing a black, .000 are sentenced to death (Appendix 2). In virtual... ...ther hand, what about an innocent person getting killed? Can we, as mere human's sentence another human being to death? In the end my feelings go with my religion. In a famous case in the Talmud, which surprisingly enough is cited in Black's book, the death penalty is discussed. Jewish law is full of the death penalty. Yet as time went on the court in ancient Jerusalem, without changing the Law, devised procedural safeguards so refined, so difficult of satisfying, that the penalty of death could only very rarely be exacted. So approved was this process that it is said in the Talmud that when one Rabbi called "destructive" a court that imposed the death sentence once in seven years, another said, " Once in seventy years", and two others said that, had they been on the great Court, no death sentence would ever have been carried out. It is my belief that in constructing these procedural safeguards to limit executions the Rabbi's were making a point. In essence they were saying, "Though the justice of God may indeed ordain that some should die, the justice of man is altogether and always insufficient for saying who these may be." I believe in the concep

My inspiration to go into medicine

People never want to become doctors. They strive towards the goal of being one. Perhaps the process of healing awakens a hidden potential for answering the mysteries of life; or provides some form of protection for the pilgrim that had himself couthed into the sheath of white: either way the attractions of medicine are undeniably numerous. What, then, of reputation or the great self-devouring love for humanity? What of saving others and finding significance in one’s own existence? All superficial! As undergraduates, we are driven by absolute inquiries into the depths of knowledge to recover fragments of our lives. Where do we fit into the puzzle of life? That’s the question. I have an image to maintain: in front of others and in front of myself. My father is a renowned pediatrician back home in New Zealand. I used to stalk him to his workplace and follow him around all through the singular years of my childhood. Not that I particularly liked staying in the hospital or anything. As a matter of fact, I despised hospitals. The scent of sterility, driven by the notion of vacuumed air straight from the void; the faded color of those walls dressed to match in uncunning fashion; and the ethereal atmosphere of the admission halls grazing through the clarity of perception as if to enforce its own presence. Ugh! But to weigh out all of these, I had a doctor’s magic! (I mean this in a strictly in a figurative sense for no matter how much of a rogue that institution turned to the normal rules of a civilized, everyday society, it had no magic there. Certainly not my father. He was a serious character, always in motion, wearing a frown and a deliberate mask of indifference. He wasn’t particularly liked by the nurses or popular among the patients, either. But he did have remarkable powers for comforting people. Whether cheeky brats, angry rebels or crybabies; my father ticketed them all through the examination roll until they were shipped back to their quarters. His executions were perfect and timely, as he never ran out of tricks to pull from the pockets of his lab coat. The essential part of the battle is to win them over,† he always used to say, So, yes, I have an image to maintain. An infolding of personality I wish to develop into the outside world. Like a newborn, it chides and kicks to be let out, and though I realize fatherly affection is still beyond me in this immature state, I want to bring this child to the world. I believe becoming a doctor is the only answer to this immortal call, and for this reason I hope to study medicine in — university. Tracing the steps I used to take in the hospital dorms, more vivid impressions surface to my mind. I remember the time when, lost in between the labyrinth of curves and swings in the hospital, I perceived the shadow of my father’s coat- just a sliver of its sheath, impressing me with such overpowering impulses. I didn’t doubt it for a moment. I followed that formless ghost until its sheath materialized in my slight grasp. Unable to control myself, I sobbed and cried: painfully†¦ shamelessly†¦ until I was completely relieved. I remember fighting by my father’s side against no worthier adversary than himself: latching myself unto him to keep him from leaving. The staff had to tear me apart from him. At that moment, I had a premonition that I might never see my father again. I cried for him to come back, but he disappeared into the bright light beyond the door at the end of the hallway. The door at the end of the hallway was big, scary; its windows were blurred; and the stripes that clambered over its bulk seemed to have forsaken all hope of stretching back to its point of origin. It really was a magnificent light and my father approached it with such a look of importance as I’ll never forget. It was priceless! The melodramatic setting; the overdramatized characters; and my utter stupidity: â€Å"I still have long ways to go,† this memory always reminds me. This child has something to share with you all. If I’m given a chance, I’m sure the prayer will be fulfilled. Teach me the secret beyond that light. Help me cross that door I daren’t cross as a fledgling. Show me I can be better.